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Fredrick M. Collison, Ph.D. 
University of Hawaii at Manoa
INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years liner shipping has undergone a number 
of changes which have been particularly important in the U.S. 
international trades. These changes have affected shipping lines, 
shippers, consignees, and intermediaries, who have had to modify 
the way in which they operate in order to be successful. This article 
will discuss some of the more important changes that have taken 
place, the impact that they have had on the industry, and what this 
means for shipping lines and their customers.1
The international liner industry serving the U.S. consists of two 
types of shipping lines - conference lines and independents, with 
both regulated economically by the Federal Maritime Commission 
(FMC). Conference lines belong to voluntary organizations, whose 
members jointly agree on the rates to be charged and the services to 
be provided by member lines, and may include the determination of 
sailing schedules and ports of call.2 A number of these Conferences 
are found in the U.S. trades and are given anti-trust immunity to 
make these joint decisions regarding rates and service. Conferences 
in the U.S. trades are required to be "open," which means that any 
line wishing to join cannot be arbitrarily denied membership. 
Independent lines operate outside the conference system making 
management decisions on an individual basis and frequently com­
peting against the conference lines.
Volume I, Number I 1
Among the recent and continuing changes that have affected the 
international liner industry in the U.S. trades are:
* implementation of the Shipping Act of 19843;
* passage of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
19884;
* increased development and sophistication of intermodal 
services;
* evolution of round-the-world services;
* overcapacity on many U.S. international trade routes.
These changes represent both problems and opportunities for both 
shipping lines and their customers. Those who adapt to these 
changes will be successful. The following sections highlight the most 
prominent features of these changes and the impacts that they have 
had on the U.S. international liner trades.
RECENT U.S. SHIPPING LEGISLATION 
Shipping Act of 1984
The Shipping Act of 1984 has resulted in a number of major 
changes in U.S. international iiner shipping. This legislation took a 
somewhat different direction than did most other contemporary 
legislation that dealt with economic regulation of transportation. 
While nearly all other legislation of the last decade resulted in some 
form of deregulation, the Shipping Act of 1984 seemed to increase 
liner shipping's exemption from anti-trust considerations.5 At the 
same time, however, the power of shippers in relation to liner con­
ference operators was also increased.
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Since the Shipping Act of 1984 is quite comprehensive, only the 
most relevant provisions will be dealt with here.6 These are:
* A clear authority for conferences and their shipping line 
members to offer intermodal rates and services;
* The right for individual conference members to take 
independent action on 10-days' notice on any rate or service 
action required to be filed in a tariff;
* Service contracts with specific rate schedules and service 
guarantees may be negotiated in which a shipper commits a 
minimum amount of cargo over a specified period of time, 
with independent action on service contracts only available to 
conference member lines when the conference permits;
* Carriers or conferences are prohibited from refusing to deal 
with shipper associations.
The above provisions created a number of changes in the relation­
ships between shipping lines and their customers. The first three 
provisions listed above resulted in much more flexibility in the 
negotiation of rate and service changes on the part of the liner 
conferences and their individual member lines serving the United 
States.
The provision of the Act which permitted conferences and their 
members to offer intermodal service has been quite important, 
because there had been legal questions about conference authority 
in this area. Prior to 1984, shipping line conferences were hesitant 
to establish intermodal services for fear of violating U.S. antitrust law. 
As a result of the Shipping Act's intermodal provisions, the number 
of intermodal services have increased dramatically, as discussed 
below. In order to preserve the prevailing environment of domestic 
transportation regulation, however, the Act specified that overland 
rates and terms of service by rail or highway were required to be 
individually negotiated between a shipping line and an overland 
carrier.
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The use of service contracts between shippers and conferences/ 
individual shipping lines has become an important result of the 
Shipping Act. A service contract provides a vehicle for negotiating 
transportation arrangements such as rates, terms of service, and 
shipper commitment of cargo between the two respective parties. 
Generally, shippers with large volumes of cargo and/or regularly 
scheduled shipment needs are in the best position to negotiate these 
contacts with shipping lines. In some cases, service contracts are 
possibly dominating scheduled liner services such as in the Japan to 
U.S. trades, where it is estimated that more than 80 percent of liner 
cargo moves under service contracts.7
The Act's inclusion of independent action on tariff rates by 
individual conference lines has also provided a method for increas­
ing the degree of competition in the U.S. international liner trades. 
Under these provisions, any conference line can establish their own 
rate separate from one filed in a conference's tariff on 10-days' 
notice. This situation will often lead to individual shipping lines filing 
rates under independent action that are below the conference's 
tariff. This can lead to lower transportation costs for those shippers 
whose cargo moves under independent action rates. The use of in­
dependent action has grown over the last couple of years. As an 
example, in April, 1988, the liner members of the Asia North 
America Eastbound Rate Agreement took over 2,400 independent 
actions, more than in all of 1987.8
Decisions by the FMC within the last year, however, are begin­
ning to place limits on individual liner flexibility for determining rates 
and services under the Act.9 The FMC has banned the use of 
changes to service contract rates based on verbal quotes a shipper 
may have received, known in the industry as “Crazy Eddies."10 
Instead, the only justification for modification to a service contract 
rate is the publication elsewhere of a rate in a tariff or other service 
contract below the existing contract rate. An additional pricing 
constraint on shipping lines under consideration by the FMC is to
4 Journal of Transportation Management
bar rate changes from a published tariff after cargo is in transit, 
known as pocket rates, in order to prevent undermining of filed tariff 
rates.
Another decision by the FMC allows conferences to ban 
independent action by their members on loyalty contracts whereby 
a lower rate may be available to a shipper who makes a specific 
minimum cargo commitment. Previously, mandatory independent 
action was available to individual conference lines on loyalty 
contracts. Mandatory independent action still exists on normal rate 
or service items filed in a conference's tariff which are available to all 
shippers. The above actions and decisions, if fully implemented, will 
probably result in increased rates paid by some shippers who are 
using conference lines for their liner shipping needs.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
This recent international trade bill deals not only with general 
trade issues but also specifically with discrimination by foreign 
governments against U.S. liner operators. With regard to shipping, 
the intent of the legislation is to increase the power of the FMC to 
deal with unfair conditions affecting U.S. flag shipping.11 The 
legislation changes the regulation of liner shipping in areas such as 
the inclusion of intermodal activities as subject to investigation and 
remedy, a wider range of penalties available to the FMC, a shorten­
ing in the length of an investigation of alleged discrimination, and 
subpoena power for the FMC to obtain critical information.12
As a result of the powers given to it by the 1988 Act, the FMC 
has proposed new sanctions against foreign lines (in addition to 
those previously available) to include:
* limits on sailings or volume or type of cargo carried to U.S. 
ports:
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* suspension of agreements relating to preferential terminal 
arrangements;
* space chartering, or pooling of cargo or revenues in 
intermodal service;
* fines of up to $1 million per voyage;
* requests to the U.S. Customs Service and/or Coast Guard to 
deny vessel clearance or entry.13
The proposed sanctions, which may be adopted in their entirety or 
modified before final implementation, will potentially give the FMC 
much greater power to control unfair shipping practices.
CURRENT LINER SERVICE DEVELOPMENTS 
Intermodalism
Intermodal liner services have continued to grow over the last 
few years, not only in the U.S. international trades but on other liner 
service routes as well.14 Intermodal service in the U.S. international 
trades today consists of three basic forms as follows:
* microbridge, in which overland transportation between an 
interior point and a port is coordinated with ocean 
transportation;
* minibridge, in which a segment of an all-water ocean 
transportation movement is replaced by an overland 
movement to/from an intermediate port;
* landbridge, in which coordinated land transportation is 
substituted for a mid-portion of an all-water ocean 
transportation movement.15
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In order to develop an efficient and effective intermodal service, 
a number of key elements must be in place. A shipping line must 
have coordinated services with carriers in one or more land-based 
modes of transportation. In the U.S., intermodal ocean service is 
available in coordination with both rail and highway carriers to/from 
many interior points. The ocean carrier must possess an adequate 
pool of equipment in the form of containers, chassis, container 
cranes, and container-handling equipment. A smooth flow with 
minimal delays must be accomplished in vessel discharge and 
loading as well as in cargo flow in the terminal area. Finally, a 
computerized control system is critical in the functioning of the inter­
modal system to ensure a high level of service.
Today, many shipping lines in the U.S. international liner trades 
offer intermodal service. Although pioneered by carriers such as 
American President Lines (APL) and Sea-Land Services (Sea-Land), a 
number of foreign lines also offer similar types of service. As an 
example, APL provides an intermodal service which includes a 
computerized information system that includes single transaction 
capability and integrated rail and highway transportation with a 
network of over 130 terminals throughout North America.16 Sea- 
Land also offers a highly developed intermodal system which 
includes overland rail and trucking services to much of the continen­
tal United States.17
A key component of intermodal liner service in the U.S. trades is 
the development of intermodal rail, and to some extent, trucking 
services. Rail service, known as container on flat car (COFC), is used 
for longer distance overland movements while trucking is generally 
used for shorter distance movements. In some cases, the intermodal 
rail service is operated by a shipping line with the actual line-haul 
rail service provided by contract between the shipping line and a rail 
carrier. In other cases a railroad may provide the service which is 
available to any shipping line that wishes to use the service. The 
railcars used in the service can be owned by either the shipping line 
or the railroad.
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One of the most recent developments in intermodal rail service 
is the use of double-stack trains where the containers are carried two 
high. These services result in lower transportation costs because 
more containers can be carried with a reduction in the weight of the 
rail cars and only a small increase in the number of engines and rail 
crew size. The growth of these services has been rapid (see Table 
1); thirty weekly eastbound double-stack services in 1986 increased 
to ninety-six in 1987. The weekly TEU capacity was over 38,000 in 
1987, up from 18,000 in 1986.18 It has been estimated that in 1987 
double-stack cars accounted for approximately thirty-five percent of 
all container miles carried by rail, up from virtually zero in 1983.19
The two largest double-stack lines for both frequency and 
capacity were American President Lines and Sea-Land. Nearly every 
other double-stack service was operated by a foreign-flag line or 
other type of carrier. The origins and destinations for these services 
are found in Table 2. Los Angeles, Seattle, and Long Beach are the 
principal eastbound ports on the U.S. west coast for double-stack 
service and the first two show the largest growth between 1986 and 
1987. The principal destinations are Chicago and New York, both 
with large growth between the two years. In nearly every case, the 
double-stack trains serving New York also provide service to 
Chicago.
As intermodalism has grown, the nature of the service provided 
has also changed. The size of containers has been growing with 
lengths increasing from forty feet to forty-five and then to forty-eight 
feet. Container heights have increased from 8.0 feet to 8.5 and 9.5 
feet. Most recently, containers of fifty-three feet in length have been 
introduced by APL. Some of the new containers introduced by APL 
and others have been initially intended for domestic service only. 
Thus, the intermodal liner services are no longer confined to just 
international transportation but are also extending the overland 
portion of the transportation movement to also include the domestic 
market.
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TABLE 1
EASTBOUND DOUBLE - STACK TRAINS FROM 









American President Lines 17 8,830 8 3,480
Sea-Land 8 3,920 7 2,800
K Line 4 1,240 1 400
Maersk 2 1,120 1 560
NYK 5 1,060 1 400
OOCL 2 660 1 360
MOL 1 480 1 400
Evergreen 2 400 — ...
Hanjin 1 400 ... —
HJCL 1 400 ... ...
YS Line 2 260 ... ...
J Line 2 200 ... ...
NOL 1 200 ... ...
U.S. Lines — — 2 700
VO-MTO's3 48 19,000 8 9,110
Totals 96 38,170 30 18,210
aVessel operating multimodal transport operators
Sources: Adapted from Review Of Maritime Transport 1987 and 1986.
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TABLE 2









Long Beach 9 3,700 6 2,300
Los Angeles 22 8,600 7 2,800
Oakland 1 560 1 400
Portland 1 300 — —
Seattle 9 3,320 2 1,080
Destination15
Chicago 35 14,150 17 7,000
Cincinnati 2 560 1 200
Columbus 5 1,360 1 400
Memphis 7 2,480 1 400
New York 2 7,780 8 3,500
Houston/Dallas 7 2,020 2 760
New Orleans 1 460 2 760
Atlanta 8 3,900 2 700
aVessel operating multimodal transport operators (VO-MTO's) not included.
bMany stack trains operate to more than one destination; frequencies and 
capacities cannot be summed.
Sources: Adapted from Review Of Maritime Transport 1987 and 1986.
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In order to tie an intermodal and international transportation 
system together, many shipping companies have implemented 
sophisticated computer systems for management and control. As 
with intermodalism itself, APL and Sea-Land have been the innova­
tors for these computerized systems with Eagle Data Access and Sea- 
Trac, respectively. These computer systems, and others like them, 
provide for shipper/consignee access to electronic booking and 
tracking of intermodal cargo, vessel schedules, container equipment 
access, and vessel space status as well as computer generation of 
required documentation,20 all of which benefits a line's customers. 
More recently, Sea-Land has developed a system known as Sea-Pay 
in which the freight billing and payment are handled electronically.21
Round-the-World Liner Service
A fairly recent development is the reimplementation of round- 
the-world (RTW) liner service, in which vessels sail in only one 
direction rather than on a route serving one geographic region. 
Only a limited number of ports are served with cargo from outlying 
areas brought to the load center ports by either feeder vessels or 
overland carriers. Overland transportation may be an intermodal 
service or a more traditional non-integrated service. Although a 
recent development, RTW service existed previously in the more 
traditional liner trades. For example, APL had such service up until 
the late 1970's, although that service did not match the current 
services since it handled primarily break-bulk cargoes.
The innovators in the new RTW services were Evergreen 
Shipping of Taiwan and U.S. Lines of the United States.22 Both 
services started in 1984 and were gradually brought up to a sailing 
schedule of weekly service from the selected load center ports. 
Evergreen started and continues to operate their service in both 
eastbound and westbound directions between the Far East, North 
America, Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Mideast. U.S. Lines'
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service was only in an eastbound direction covering the same basic 
service areas as Evergreen. In late 1986, U.S. Lines filed for bank­
ruptcy and the vessels of the RTW service were sold.
More recently, other lines such as Senator Line have started 
RTW service while Evergreen has expanded its service. In most 
cases these services use large vessels with limited numbers of ports of 
call. RTW services have generally required large, regular volumes of 
cargo in order to be profitable, given the high levels of vessel, 
operating, and start-up costs. Since these services may not provide 
as high a level of service as those of intermodal carriers, the rates a 
RTW liner service can charge are often lower than those for intermo­
dal service.23 The success that Evergreen in RTW service can 
partially be explained by the fact that they offer intermodal service in 
conjunction with the RTW service. The number of lines offering 
RTW service continues to be much more limited than those offering 
intermodal services, indicating that there may not be a high level of 
shipper demand for this service.
Vessel Size
Containerization in the liner trades led to the development of 
new vessel designs in order to take advantage of the new transporta­
tion technology. The initial vessels, however, were often small and 
in many cases converted from existing vessels not designed for 
containerization, thus creating inefficient container ships. More 
recently, however, container vessels have increased in technological 
sophistication to better use the technology of containerization as 
well as the more recent intermodal liner services. The increased 
sophistication has put pressure on shipping lines to reduce operating 
costs which has led to an escalation of container ship sizes.24
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Newer containerships are now routinely above 2,500 TEU 
(twenty-foot equivalent length containers) capacity with lengths of 
800-900 feet and more. As of mid-1988, nearly forty percent of the 
world container fleet was of more than 2,500 TEU capacity, while 
ninety-two percent of the capacity to be added by mid-1990 is of 
this size.25 Container vessels on order or placed in service since the 
beginning of 1987 or currently out for bid will add approximately 
397,000 TEU to the world fleet.26 Characteristics of some recent or 
projected containerships are found in Table 3. Of particular note is 
the APL C-10 class vessel with a beam of over 129 feet. This design 
represents a break with tradition since these vessels cannot transit 
the Panama Canal where the maximum beam is 106 feet. All other 
existing vessels listed in the table are able to fit through the Panama 
Canal although many of them do not actually transit the canal.
The increasing vessel sizes place a number of constraints on 
containerized liner service systems. Additional investments are 
required to acquire new and larger vessels and containers, improve 
and enlarge port facilities, purchase new container cranes and other 
handling equipment, and improve the sea/overland transportation 
interface. The large vessel sizes create more inflexibility in how 
these container vessels are used. The number of trade routes where 
these vessels can call are limited by available cargo volumes and 
length of route. Additionally, many ports cannot be used due to 
channel, pier, and container crane constraints. The new APL ships 
described earlier are not only confined to the Pacific but are able to 
call at only eight ports throughout their area of service.27 As a result, 
increased reliance must be placed on feeder services to the load 
center ports, either via smaller containerships or overland modes. 
These feeder services are an important consideration in the function­
ing of intermodal and round-the-world liner services previously 
described.
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Overcapacity
The escalating sizes of vessels, particularly for containerships 
discussed in the previous section, have helped to create an oversup­
ply of shipping service in the liner trades. In the world general cargo 
and unitized fleets, which include container, break-bulk, and other 
types of vessels, the overcapacity in deadweight was on the order of 
six percent.28 This represented a decline for the general cargo fleet 
and the same level for the unitized fleet when compared with the 
early to mid I970's. Since a relatively large percentage of break-bulk 
and containerized cargoes are of low density, deadweight may not 
be a good measure for evaluating overcapacity.
A previous paper reported estimates of containership overcapac­
ity in the Trans-Pacific and Trans-Atlantic container trades, with 
overall load factors for TEU of seventy-six and seventy percent 
respectively in 1986, representing declines from 1983 figures.29 A 
more recent report estimates that the load factors in both trades are 
nearly the same or worse in the 1986-87 time period, being ap­
proximately seventy percent for both trades, as found in Table 4.30 
The Europe/Far East container trades are estimated to have a higher 
load factor of about eighty-three percent. This data indicates that 
not only is the overcapacity problem persisting but it is somewhat 
growing worse, at least for the U.S. containerized liner trades.
The worsening overcapacity problem in the U.S. liner trades 
creates a number of difficulties for shipping lines. One of these is 
increased competition among the lines in these trades, even when 
conferences are found on a particular trade route. Since confer­
ences in the U.S. liner trades are required to be open, a shipping 
line can withdraw from the conference if constrained too much 
knowing that it can easily rejoin the conference if it desires. As a 
result, downward pressure is often exerted on the rates by inde­
pendent liner operators and the threat of conference members to 
become independents.
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TABLE 3








Length, ft. 950 860 903 750 N/A
Beam, ft. 106 106 129.2 105.6 N/A
Draft, ft. 29.5 35 41 32 N/A
Speed, knots 19.1 25 24.2 19.5 N/A
Capacity, TEUb 3,400 2,500 4,300 2,728 4,000
^Former New York class vessels of U.S. Lines; vessel TEU capacity downsized 
from 4,482.
bTEU = twenty-foot equivilent units.
Sources: Marine Engineering/Log, Containerisation International, American 
Shipper.
This inability to implement or sustain rate increases is exactly 
what has often happened in the U.S. liner trades.31 Liner shipping 
rates of the U.S. Atlantic/Northern Europe Conference declined 
approximately fourteen percent between 1984 and 1986. The 
twenty-five percent decline of liner freight rates to parts of Europe 
between 1985 and 1987, including both U.S. and non-U.S. trades, is 
a further indication of this downward rate pressure. Liner rates in 
the eastbound Trans-Pacific trades are estimated to have declined by
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ten percent or more during 1988. As a result, a number of confer­
ences and shipping lines have found it difficult to increase operating 
revenues, even in the face of escalating operating costs and the need 
to purchase additional vessels and equipment to remain competitive.
Another issue facing shipping lines due to overcapacity is the use 
of rebates, where a shipping line makes payments to customers who 
use their liner service. This effectively reduces the transportation 
rate charged below that filed in the legal tariff. Although rebating is 
a common practice in the world liner trades, Federal law prohibits 
such actions by shipping lines in the U.S. international liner trades. 
Previous enforcement action was undertaken by the FMC in the 
Trans-Atlantic trades and similar action is now underway in the
TABLE 4












Trans-Pacific 4.4 6.3 70%
Trans-Atlantic 2.8 4.0 70%
Europe/Far East 2.0 2.4 83%
Sources: Adapted from Review of Maritime Transport 1987.
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Trans-Pacific trades.32 One line was recently fined $2.5 million and 
further enforcement action is expected. Liner firms find it difficult to 
resist using rebates to encourage cargo bookings given the current 
overcapacity, but the rebates are illegal nonetheless.
The current overcapacity has thus created financial difficulties 
for some shipping lines, both foreign and U.S.33 As an example, U.S. 
Lines had to declare Chapter 11 bankruptcy in late 1986 because of 
difficulties with its RTW service and will apparently not recover from 
this situation. Not only were the 11 rates too low and vessel 
capacity too large, but U.S. Lines was not carrying enough high rated 
cargo. Lykes Line and Hapag-Lloyd also withdrew from the Trans­
pacific trades while Showa Line of Japan withdrew in early 1988 
from nearly all liner trades including the Trans-Pacific. Financial 
difficulties are also being experienced on other trade routes due to 
the overcapacity problem.
ANALYSIS
The environment for liner shipping in the U.S. international 
trades today is one that potentially creates both problems and 
opportunities for all concerned. Whether a firm is a shipping line, 
shipper, consignee, or intermediary, its operations have been 
affected. The reaction to the current environment and the anticipa­
tion of the future environment will help to determine a firm's success 
or failure. The following sections examine the impacts on and 
reactions of shipping lines and their customers.
Shipping Line Effects
The effects of the environment on liner shipping are numerous. 
The Shipping Act of 1984 determines to some extent the nature and 
scope of these effects. The three principal components of intermo- 
dal authority, mandatory independent action, and service contracts
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discussed earlier have resulted in changes in the industry that have, 
in some cases, worsened the effects of the current overcapacity 
problem. Mandatory independent action and service contracts, in 
particular, have been used by individual shipping lines to lower the 
rates charged for international liner transportation. As a result, 
shipping line profitability has eroded for many lines since lower rates 
don't always result in increased total revenue and/or profitability.
A number of surveys and meetings evaluating the Shipping Act 
have taken place since its implementation nearly five years ago.34 
These have found major disagreements between how shipping lines 
view the Act as compared to shippers (covered below). Shipping 
lines appear to have the most concerns about the mandatory 
independent action for conferences required by the Act, which has 
generally led to a depressed level of rates. Shipping lines have also 
expressed reservations about service contracts, which have often 
resulted in lower rates than might otherwise have been obtained.
Shipping lines, however, have positive views about other 
portions of the Act as well. Principal among these are the stream­
lined process to implement new rates and services, increased anti­
trust immunity, and the ability to offer intermodal rates and services. 
This last view is reinforced by the large growth in intermodal services 
since the passage of the Act in 1984. Overall, the overcapacity that 
exists in the liner trades accounts to some degree for the carrier 
dissatisfaction. In a market with a better balance between supply 
and demand, there would be much less pressure to lower rates 
through independent action or service contracts.
The liner conferences and individual lines in the U.S. trades 
have instituted actions to address the overcapacity issue and its 
impacts. Although overcapacity affects most liner trades in the 
world, it appears to be more acute in the U.S. trades because of the 
size of the gap between supply of capacity and cargo available. One 
way in which this situation can be addressed is for liner conferences
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to rationalize (reduce) service among their members in order to 
decrease total capacity. For example, conference and independent 
shipping lines in the trans-Pacific trades have recently agreed to cut 
eastbound container capacity.35 The result of this rationalization 
may be the increase of shipping rates in both directions on the trans­
pacific trades and reduced numbers of independent actions by 
individual lines.
Another strategy to cope with overcapacity has been to form 
joint services through what are known as space charters. These 
services use the ships of one or more lines, with space on each 
vessel allocated to two or more shipping lines, even though the 
vessel may be operated by a single liner firm. A space charter 
agreement allows two or more lines to participate on a liner route 
without each line having to operate its own vessels, thus easing the 
overcapacity situation. Space charters have been concluded, among 
others, by Sea-Land with Nedlloyd and Trans Freight Lines and 
Atlantic Container Line with Wilhelmsen and Hapag-Lloyd in the 
trans-Atlantic trades, and Barber Blue Sea with Norwegian Special­
ized Auto Carriers in the trans-Pacific trades.36 Another possibility is 
the merger of shipping lines in order to create a more efficient 
carrier, such as the proposed merger of Lykes with Farrell Lines.37
The continued evolution of liner service appears to be toward a 
greater offering of intermodal service, as opposed to more traditional 
liner service or RTW service. Although RTW service has expanded 
somewhat, the bankruptcy of U.S. Lines removed a major competi­
tor from this market. Evergreen has enjoyed success in this segment 
of international liner shipping but few other lines have implemented 
similar services. Traditional liner services, which handle break-bulk 
or general cargo, are still quite viable in the less developed U.S. 
international trades such as those with much of Africa. The liner 
trades between industrialized nations will probably be dominated 
even more by container and intermodal shipping in the years to 
come.
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Intermodal service, as discussed previously, has grown dramati­
cally. Part of this is undoubtedly due to the freedom granted by the 
Shipping Act of 1984 for conferences to offer such service. These 
services have expanded to include multiple overland modes, the 
stack-trains described earlier, domestic transportation service, and 
well-developed computer information systems to support intermo- 
dalism and are now marketed as a value-added service.38 The stack- 
train services, through their expansion to domestic transportation, 
are apparently beginning to replace the trailer on flat car (TOFC) 
intermodal services offered by U.S. railroads. More and more ship­
ping lines are expanding the scope of intermodal service they can 
directly offer, as is found with APL and Evergreen. Sea-Land has 
taken this one step further since, through their ownership by CSX, 
they are often able to offer a complete intermodal movement for 
which CSX has complete responsibility.
Shipping Line Customer Effects
As with the shipping lines, shippers have also been dramatically 
affected by the Shipping Act of 1984. In the case of shippers, the 
effects of the Act have, for the most part, been quite positive.39 
While shipping lines find independent action and service contracts a 
barrier to achieving financial success, just the opposite is true of 
shippers primarily because rate reductions through both means have 
been quite prevalent in recent years. Not all shippers have necessar­
ily benefited as a result of service contracts and independent action, 
since some are not large enough to enjoy the deepest rate reduc­
tions.
There have been a number of specific benefits enjoyed by 
shippers in addition to the reduced transportation costs resulting 
from reduced rate levels. Among these benefits are increased 
intermodal services, faster transit times, more sailings, and greater 
choices between the origin/destination gateways used.40 Many of 
these benefits have resulted from the increased intermodal services
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since these services must emphasize speed, frequency, reliability, 
and geographic scope of coverage in order to attract shipper cargo. 
Thus, there have been a range of benefits to shippers as a result of 
the Shipping Act.
The overcapacity in international liner shipping today has 
generally benefitted shippers who use these services. Overcapacity, 
with the resulting pressure to decrease rates, has allowed shippers 
the opportunity to negotiate favorable shipping rates. This has been 
done through service contracts or through conference rate levels and 
independent action on the part of individual shipping lines. Concur­
rently, shipping lines have had to be responsive to the full range of 
needs of shippers, thus enabling many shippers to receive higher 
levels of service. The lower levels of rates have created some 
uncertainties with regard to the availability of particular shipping 
services when a line drops a particular service.41
The range of liner service available to shippers today is much 
greater than it was only a few years ago. Shippers can now choose 
among traditional break-bulk, containerized, RTW, and intermodal 
services. In order to make these choices, however, a shipper needs 
to better understand the transportation decision environment. Thus, 
to make a good decision about what carrier and service to use, the 
shipper may have to make a total cost analysis of the transportation 
alternatives. For a high value or perishable cargo, a reliable intermo­
dal service can potentially offer the lowest total logistics cost,42 even 
though the transportation cost may be higher than other liner 
alternatives. A shipper of lower value non-perishable goods, 
however, might be better to choose a more traditional, container­
ized, or RTW liner service offering lower transportation and total 
logistics cost.
Although an intermodal service may offer a higher level of 
service, it does have some potential drawbacks for a shipper. One 
of these is that the shipper will no longer have control over the 
selection of individual overland carriers. The intermodal shipping
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line will, in most cases, have already selected the inland carriers to 
use for its intermodal service. The heavy reliance on rail transporta­
tion could lead to increased loss and damage when compared with 
the use of a highway carrier for overland transportation. These 
considerations will often be outweighed by the advantages to 
intermodal shipping.
Other types of liner service also have potential drawbacks as 
well. The non-intermodal services require a shipper to make a 
wider range of transportation decisions regarding type of service to 
use, which carriers to select, how to ensure efficient cargo transfer 
from one carrier to another, and what routes to use. Additionally, 
the amount of documentation will generally be much greater for the 
non-intermodal services. For shippers who are not well versed in 
international transportation, intermodal service offers a way to ship 
cargo internationally without having to necessarily acquire the 
expertise in-house. Thus, intermodal liner service can be advanta­
geous to not only shippers of high value cargo but to others as well.
CONCLUSIONS
The dynamic environment both within and outside liner 
shipping in the U.S. international trades has caused many changes. 
Regulatory changes have created an environment of greater compe­
tition in liner shipping. The Shipping Act of 1984 with its provisions 
for intermodal service, independent action, and service contracts, 
created stronger competition. Recent rulings or pending actions by 
the FMC may, however, reduce carrier pricing flexibility with 
resulting rate increases. The outcome of a formal review of the Act 
will take place during 1989, and the implementation of any subse­
quent recommendations cannot be determined at the present time. 
Likewise, the actual role of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988 in liner shipping has yet to be fully determined.
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In spite of the uncertainties, the current overcapacity in the 
industry will probably continue to exert downward pressure on 
rates. The increasing vessel and fleet sizes will continue to contrib­
ute to this overcapacity. Current efforts in the industry to rationalize 
liner service through space charters, mergers, and capacity restric­
tions should relieve some of the pressure. The capacity reductions 
in the industry will probably not be sufficient to alleviate the situ­
ation in the near term. As a result, rate increases may be difficult to 
sustain and practices such as below tariff rates and rebating may be 
difficult to completely eliminate in the U.S. international trades.
The competitive environment has also witnessed a growth in the 
types of international liner service available. Intermodalism has 
grown rapidly and can be expected to continue to expand, although 
the growth rate will slow at some point in the future. RTW services 
appear to have stabilized in size and market impact and can be ex­
pected to remain stable without major environmental changes. 
Containerized shipping, be it via intermodal, RTW, or traditional 
liner service will continue to dominate the trades w'ith developed 
nations. Traditional break-bulk liner services appear to be confined 
primarily to the trades with less-developed nations where the 
overland transportation infrastructure is more rudimentary.
The current difficulties with the level of rates and the wide range 
of liner services available has created a real need for more efficient 
and effective management. Shipping lines require management that 
is able to cope with an environment of overcapacity and reduced 
rate levels. Management must also be in a position to make effective 
decisions regarding the competing needs to reduce overcapacity yet 
at the same time purchase new' vessels and equipment to maintain a 
competitive edge. This tradeoff is especially critical for intermodal 
lines, where the current technological lead on competition may not 
last very long.
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Likewise, shippers, consignees, and intermediaries require 
effective management. Although lower rates are generally an 
advantage to shipping line customers, decisions are still required in a 
number of areas. The wide range of services available and the 
potential flexibility in rates means that a firm must do a careful 
analysis to determine the best shipping alternative. This analysis 
must not only include the ocean transportation cost incurred but 
also other transportation and logistics costs. Thus, the changing en­
vironment is a challenge to both shipping lines and their customers.
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